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The second function, which it is argued, is not receiving anything like adequate attention in the Federal Government, is continuing basic and operational research on and speculative study of Communism and the means of countering Communism. The subject matter, to be more explicit, would be Communism viewed as a secular religion, the world Communist movement animated by this religion, the network of organizations which are the institutional embodiment of the Communist movement, and the governments dominated by it. The scope of the inquiry would be broad, covering Communist thought, strategy, tactics, capabilities, organization, and major personalities. It would include such intellectual activities as the formulation and testing of hypotheses as to present and probable future courses of development of Communist ends and means and of the Communist apparatus, the comparative study of Communist strategy and tactics in different countries and in different historical phases, reflection on the strengths and weaknesses of Communist ideology, its consistency with Communist practice, its appeal, and on the possible means of effective intellectual competition with it, and similar inquiries into the enemy's philosophy, character, and behavior. The inquiry would also involve appraisal of the susceptibility of different societies to Communism, consideration of the policies and attitudes toward Communism of the US and other non-Communist countries, and it would inevitably produce proposals for US action and policy. The work should be carried on by a small group of individuals of high professional competence, chosen or developed as specialists in the practical study of Communism, who would not be burdened with the task of turning out finished intelligence in its more familiar forms. They should be allowed to spend more of their time than is usual in the Government on fundamental research, that is, on thoughtful investigation and analysis which would be expected to yield neither certain nor prompt results in the form of useful intelligence, but their work should, as the foregoing characterization implies, be oriented toward the possibilities for operations and considerations of policy. It may be asked how the activity thus defined differs from "the production of political, social and economic intelligence" on Communism. The answer is that, as a practical matter, existing intelligence production staffs do not do what is here proposed, would not do so even if their work were expanded along the lines of current proposals (e.g. the prospectus for additional sections on Communism in the NIS), and that their organization and activities could not be readily modified to permit them to do so. Basically what would be expected of the individuals engaged in this work would not be more information or even better analysis of Communist developments so much as more penetrating insights into the nature of Communist phenomena, greater p-

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29

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54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

judging their probable evolution and more originality in the consideration of the means of countering Communism. Thus the activities of these individuals would be deliberately extended beyond the limits of the intelligence function. Their function would include that of a "red team" in war planning, which tries to reproduce the enemy's mind, and that of policy planners who weigh both enemy capabilities and those of their own side, in judging possible courses of action. What would really differentiate the function from those normally performed in the intelligence community would be the concentration of a combination of certain intelligence, evaluation, and planning responsibilities with respect to the broad but by no means all-embracing subject matter characterized above in the hands of a single small group of people.

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- Excerpt from [REDACTED] memo to DCI, dated 9 Nov 54.

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